The Angolan Presidency: The Epicentre of Corruption
Introduction
This report shows how the Presidency of the Republic of Angola has become the site of shady business deals, a fact that has consequences for citizens’ freedom and development, as well as for the country’s political and economic stability. The text responds President José Eduardo dos Santos’s call, on 21 November 2009, for a zero tolerance policy against corruption.
For the sake of clarity, this investigation limits itself to a small demonstration of the business practices employed by the minister of State and head of the Military Bureau (Casa Militar) in the Presidency, General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”. This is the man responsible for co-ordinating the defence and security sectors of the state. General Kopelipa is one of the triumvirate that today dominates Angola’s political economy, along with General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento “Dino”, the presidency’s head of telecommunications, and Manuel Vicente, the chairman and CEO of the national oil company, Sonangol. Their dealings acknowledge no distinction between public and private affairs. Manuel Vicente is the link that connects the considerable powers accumulated by the generals, to Sonangol and to his own position as one of the most powerful members of the MPLA Political Bureau, for being the president’s protégé, and in charge of overseeing the private business dealings of the ruling party.
Sonangol is the biggest company in the country and the state’s major source of revenue. Several analysts have viewed Sonangol as the most important factor in ensuring the survival of President Dos Santos’s regime – in the worlds of finance, politics and diplomacy as well as the main source of illegal self-enrichment for the top state officials.
In some instances the report refers to the relationships of mutual interest and complicity with other members of the government and public officials in carrying out business, that involves the looting of state assets, and other acts that go against the law of the land.
Key sectors such as petroleum, telecommunications, banking, media and diamonds form part of the business empire built by these figures. The firms involved include Movicel, Biocom, Banco Espírito Santo Angola, Nazaki Oil & Gás, Media Nova, World Wide Capital and Lumanhe.
The report frequently refers to the Law on Public Probity, even in cases that date from before it was signed into law in March 2010 and consolidated various anti-corruption provisions that had been in force since 1989. All of the articles contained within the Law on Public Probity can be found among this earlier body of law. In the interests of greater clarity, this text therefore refers to the Law on Public Probity as an overarching reference to the laws in force since 1989. For instance, the Law on the Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers (Law 21/90) prohibits public office bearers from entering into business deals over which they would have influence or decision-making powers in the course of their official duties (art. 10, 2).
President’s three henchmen lead the plunder of state assets in Angola
Report to be published online at www.makaangola.com on August 4 2010
Lisbon – In his latest report, “The Angolan Presidency: The Epicentre of Corruption”, Angolan journalist and human rights activist Rafael Marques de Morais focuses on the illicit business links of a powerful triumvirate of officials close to President José Eduardo dos Santos.
These officials are the head of the Military Bureau of the Presidency, the head of Telecommunications at the Presidency, and the CEO and chair of national oil company Sonangol, respectively General Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior “Kopelipa”, General Leopoldino Fragoso do Nascimento, and Manuel Vicente.
“Their dealings acknowledge no distinction between public and private affairs, and this has allowed them to channel millions of dollars worth of state assets into their own private businesses,” Marques de Morais says.
One of the tools used by these officials for their private operations, according to the report, is the power and the international reputation of Sonangol as well as their influence on the presidential decisions as the head of the executive, which approves all investments worth over five million dollars. Through their company Nazaki, the trio established a partnership with Sonangol and Cobalt, a US oil company listed in the New York Stock Exchange. This consortium holds the license to explore two deepwater oil blocks ( 9 and 21) in Angola, awarded by the executive without public tender.
With Sonangol and the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht, the group also formed a consortium, through their company Damer, for a 272.3 million dollar project for sugar, ethanol and biofuels production. This project was approved by the Council of Ministers.
The same individuals, according to the report, used senior military officials in the presidency as fronts for a company, Portmill, which paid 375 million dollars for the purchase of 24% of the shares in the Portuguese Banco Espírito Santo. The same company received 40% shares in the recently privatised mobile phone company Movicel. The report questions the origin of the incredible sum of money paid by the military officers, assigned to the presidential staff, to the Portuguese bank. It also raises the question of whether Banco Espírito Santo is willfully involved in laundering money either stolen from the state coffers or of obscure origin.
The author details how the Generals Kopelipa and Dino and Manuel Vicente also built a media empire to strategically control the private media sector, among other business interests.
“These officials break the laws with blatant impunity”, says Marques de Morais. He explains that “the law on the Crimes Committed by Public Office Bearers, in force since 1990, forbids public officials from engaging in business deals with the state or even private ones in which they have power of decision or influence, for personal benefit.”
The author further argues that while there is a growing pressure on governments and companies to be more transparent, with initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Publish What You Pay, “in Angola, such safeguards exist only on paper and the same names of prominent officials and generals come up time and time again in their double life as the country’s political and business elite.”
Furthermore, according to Marques de Morais, “the complex web of political/military/economic power is lubricated by funds either plundered from the state or of obscure origin, and often in partnership with foreign companies and governments.”
Marques de Morais, who has been investigating corruption in his country for years, has little faith in the President’s public stand against corruption. “In reality, the zero tolerance policy against corruption, trumpeted by President Dos Santos, stands as a mere mask covering up the plunder of the country by his inner circle,” he says.
Some western governments, spearheaded by the United States, have been jostling for political influence and access to Angola’s oil and other riches, and have paid lip service to the need for good governance in the country. On July 8 2010 The US and Angola signed a Strategic Partnership Dialogue to increase “energy, security, trade and democracy promotion”, according to the State Department.
Meanwhile, other major economic players in Angola, such as China, Brazil and Portugal fuel outright corruption through oil-backed loans and opaque economic bilateral agreements. This ensures that nothing much changes in the oil- and resource-rich southern African country, except that the sums of money involved get bigger and bigger.
“The spoils of power in Angola are shared by the few, while the many remain poor,” Marques de Morais concludes.
Contact details
Rafael Marques de Morais – Mobile Phone: +351 914 101 323
E-mail: rm_demorais@hotmail.com
Website: www.makaangola.com
The Self-Dealings of Sonangol’s CEO
On 20 May 2002, the chairman of the board and CEO of Sonangol, Manuel Vicente, went into partnership with Grinaker LTA International Holdings, a South African company, the Banco Africano de Investimentos (BAI), and Mário Palhares in setting up Grinaker LTA Angola – Civil Construction and Public Works. Each partner took an equal 25% shareholding.
When Corruption in Angola is Easier than in Nigeria
As I heard from a Washington risk analyst, two days ago, corruption in Angola is easier to deal with because it is centralized while in Nigeria, for instance, it is decentralized, and many more demand their share. Furthermore, he argued that it is common view in Washington that the Angolan regime has a tighter grip on power, thus guaranteeing political stability by sheer force, unlike in Nigeria.
My view is that Nigeria, with all its problems, is building state institutions that can survive presidents. A case in point is the way in which state institutions guaranteed the naming of Mr. Goodluck Jonathan as acting president, while President Yar Adua battles ill-health. In the case of Angola the only guarantee of stability seems to be the person of President Dos Santos. A cult of personality has replaced state-building.
Manuel Vicente’s raid on Sonangol
In 2008, Manuel Vicente, the chairman of the board and director general of the Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, restructured the company and its main subsidiaries for his personal benefit.
The same year, petroleum exports exceeded US$62 billion, according to the World Bank: 97.7% of Angola’s exports. These figures demonstrate the crucial role of Sonangol in the country’s political economy, as the only Angolan concession-holder in the industry.
Manuel Vicente did a business deal with himself when he illegally transferred a percentage of Sonangol Holdings into his own name, thus making himself a formal (private) shareholder in virtually all the multi-million dollar deals of the state-owned business.
Acknowledgement
Last November I launched the Anti-Corruption Initiative, as a volunteer act of citizenry and of individual responsibility. The documented evidence I have been able to gather has inspired me to contribute, against all risks, to increase public knowledge on issues related to Angola’s current political economy.
A few friends have expressed their solidarity to the project by spontaneously contributing with moral, material and financial support for its maintenance. It is with the utmost gratitude that I acknowledge the support of:
| Molly Hickok | US$7,500 |
| António Mestre | US$1,500 |
| Jim Kirkwood | US$1,000 |
Foul Play: Corruption and the 2010 Africa Cup of Nations
On 31 January 2010, Egypt emerged the victor in the Africa Cup of Nations, for the seventh time. Celebrations erupted in Cairo, while in Angola, which organised and hosted the championship, the final marked the return to reality.
In between the football matches I took the time to investigate the points at which corruption and influence peddling could potentially occur in the process of organising the Cup of Nations. The first case that I am reporting concerns the inspection contract for the construction of the Luanda stadium, which was performed by Soenco, a company belonging to the deputy-minister of Public Works, José Joana André.
UNICER: Brewing corruption in Angola (updated version)
In previous investigations I have examined at how members of the Angolan government went into partnership with the multinationals Castel Group and SABMiller in order to gain control of the drinks market in the country. This article looks at the case of UNICER, the main beverage manufacturer in Portugal.
UNICER’s business partners are the current Ministers of Industry and of Petroleum, respectively Joaquim David and José Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos, as well as the Governor of Benguela Province, General Armando da Cruz Neto and the former President of the National Private Investment Agency, Carlos Fernandes.
MPLA, Ltd.
During the MPLA’s Central Committee meeting in Luanda in November 2009, President José Eduardo dos Santos defined his challenges facing his party in terms of three fundamental questions: keeping watch on government, the irresponsibility of government leaders, and fighting corruption with a policy of zero tolerance.
In this investigation I deal with the transfer of state assets to the MPLA’s private businesses through a company called GEFI (Sociedade de Gestão e Participações Financeiras / Management and Business Participation Company), and the consequences of its involvement in such money-making activities.
In order to make clear the gap between the leadership’s words and its deeds, I will analyse those three main questions that Dos Santos, both President of the Republic and leader of the MPLA, put forward during his speech when he opened the party Central Committee meeting on 29 November 2009.
The business dealings of Angolan Members of Parliament
It has become common practice for Angolan Members of Parliament to set up commercial companies with members of the government and with foreign investors for personal gain, in the same way that they have done with state contracts. This practice potentially creates situations that prevent them from conducting their duties as parliamentarians, as well as conflicts of interest and influence peddling. In short, it risks making corruption an institution inside parliament.
I present the first six cases of parliamentarians whose business activities and extra-parliamentary roles raise various questions in the light of current legislation. This series of investigations, exclusively based on official documents, is intended above all to inform public opinion in a way that will make people aware of how our leaders are using the name and sovereign power of the Angolan people. Whose interests are they serving? That is the question.
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